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Abstract. In this invited contribution, we propose a comprehensive in-
troduction to game theory applied in computer aided synthesis. In this
context, we give some classical results on two-player zero-sum games and
then on multi-player non zero-sum games. The simple case of one-player
games is strongly related to automata theory on infinite words. All along
the article, we focus on general approaches to solve the studied problems,
and we provide several illustrative examples as well as intuitions on the
proofs.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is a well-developed branch of mathematics that is applied to var-
ious domains like economics, biology, computer science, etc. It is the study of
mathematical models of interaction and conflict between individuals and the
understanding of their decisions assuming that they are rational [54,70].
The last decades have seen a lot of research on algorithmic questions in game
theory motivated by problems from computer aided synthesis. One important
line of research is concerned with reactive systems that must continuously react
to the uncontrollable events produced by the environment in which they evolve.
A controller of a reactive system indicates which actions it has to perform to
satisfy a certain objective against any behavior of the environment. An example
in air traffic management is the autopilot that controls the speed of the plane,
but have no control on the weather conditions. Such a situation can be modeled
by a two-player game played on a graph: the system and the environment are
the two players, the vertices of the graph model the possible configurations,
the infinite paths in the graph model all the continuous interactions between the
system and the environment. In this game, the system wants to achieve a certain
objective while the environment tries to prevent it to do so. The objectives
of the two players are thus antagonistic and we speak of zero-sum games. In
this framework, checking whether the system is able to achieve its objective
reduces to the existence of a winning strategy in the corresponding game, and
building a controller reduces to computing such a strategy [38]. Whether such
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a controller can be automatically designed from the objective is known as the
synthesis problem.
Another, more recent, line of research is concerned with the modelization
and the study of complex systems. Instead of the simple situation of a system
embedded in a hostile environment, we are faced with systems/environments
formed of several components each of them with their own objectives that are
not necessarily conflicting. Imagine the situation of several users behind their
computers on a shared network. In this case, we use the model of multi-player
non zero-sum games played on graphs : the components are the different players,
each of them aiming at satisfying his objective. In this context, the synthesis
problem is a little different: winning strategies are no longer appropriate and
are replaced by the concept of equilibrium, that is, a strategy profile where no
player has an incentive to deviate [39]. Different kinds of equilibria have been
investigated among which the famous notion of Nash equilibrium [53].
A lot of study has been done about Boolean objectives, in particular about
the class of ω-regular objectives, like avoiding a deadlock, always granting a
request, etc [38]. An infinite path in the game graph is either winning or losing
depending on whether the objective is satisfied or not. To allow richer objectives,
such as minimizing the energy consumption or guaranteeing a limited response
time to a request, existing models have been enriched with quantitative aspects
in a way to associate a payoff (or a cost) to all paths in the game graph [19]. In
this setting, we speak of quantitative objectives, and a classical decision problem
in two-player zero-sum games is whether there exists a winning strategy for the
system that ensures a payoff satisfying some given constraints no matter how the
environment behaves. For instance we would like an energy consumption lying
within a certain given interval. The same kind of question is also considered for
multi-player non zero-sum games, that is, whether there exists an equilibrium
such that the payoff of each player satisfies the constraints.
Decidability of those problems is not enough. Indeed in case of positive an-
swer, it is important to know the exact complexity class of the problem and
how complex are the strategies used to solve it. Given past interactions between
the players, a strategy for a player indicates the next action he has to perform.
The amount of memory on those past interactions is one of the ways to express
the complexity of the strategy. The simplest strategies are those that require no
memory at all. When all these characteristics are known and indicate practical
applicability of the models, the final step is the implementation of the solving
strategies into a program (like for instance a controller for a reactive system) by
using adequate data structures and possibly heuristics.
In this article, we propose a comprehensive introduction to classical algorith-
mic solutions to the synthesis problem for two-player zero-sum games and for
multi-player non zero-sum games. A complementary survey can be found in [9],
and detailed expositions in the case of Boolean objectives are provided in [38,39].
We study the existence of winning strategies (in two-player zero-sum games) and
equilibria (in multi-player non zero-sum games) satisfying some given constraints,
in particular the complexity class of the decision problem and the memory re-
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quired for the related strategies. We provide several illustrative examples as well
as intuitions on some proofs. We do not intend to present an exhaustive sur-
vey, but rather focus on some lines of research, with an emphasis on general
approaches. In particular, we only consider (i) turned-based (and not concurrent)
games such that the players choose their actions in a turned-based way (and
not concurrently), (ii) deterministic (and not stochastic) games such that their
edges are deterministic and not labeled by probabilities (iii) pure (and not ran-
domized) strategies such that the next action is chosen in a deterministic way
(and not according to a probability distribution).
Our approach is as follows. We begin with a general definition of game that
includes the class of games with Boolean objectives and the class of games
with quantitative objectives. For two-player zero-sum games, we present a cri-
terium [36] that implies, for several large families of games, the existence of mem-
oryless winning strategies ensuring a payoff satisfying some given constraints. For
non zero-sum multi-player games, we present a characterization of plays (used
for instance in [14,65]) that are the outcome of a Nash equilibrium. The existence
of Nash equilibrium in many different families of games is derived from this char-
acterization, as well as results on the existence of a Nash equilibrium satisfying
some constraints. We also present two other well-studied equilibria: the secure
equilibria [23] and the subgame perfect equilibria [61]. For the studied decision
problems, in addition to the results derived from our general approaches, we
provide in this survey an overview of known results for games with Boolean and
quantitative objectives.
The article is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we introduce the
concepts of game and strategy, we then present the studied decision problems,
and we finally recall the Boolean and quantitative objectives that are classically
studied. In Section 3 devoted to two-player zero-sum games, we begin with the
simple case of one-player games, and show how the decision problems are con-
nected to problems in automata theory and numeration systems. We then present
the general criterium mentioned before, and then the solutions to the decision
problems for the classes of games with Boolean and quantitative objectives. Fi-
nally, we present several recent extensions of those classes of games, where for
instance the single objective is replaced by a Boolean intersection of several ob-
jectives. The case of multi-player non zero-sum games is investigated in Section 4
by starting with the characterization of outcomes of Nash equilibrium. Derived
results on the existence of Nash equilibrium (under some given constraints) are
then detailed, followed by a study of other kinds of equilibria like secure and
subgame perfect equilibria. We provide a short conclusion in Section 5.
2 Terminology and studied problems
We consider multi-player turn-based games played on finite directed graphs. The
set of vertices are partitioned among the different players. A play is an infinite
sequence of vertices obtained by moving an imaginary pebble from vertex to
vertex according to existing edges. The owner of the current vertex decides what
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is the next move of the pebble according to some strategy. Each player follows
a strategy in a way to achieve a certain objective. This objective depends on a
preference relation that the player has on the payoffs assigned to plays. In this
section, we introduce all these notions and state the problems studied in this
article.
2.1 Preliminaries
Games We begin with the notions of arena and game.
Definition 1. An arena is a tuple A = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E) where:
– Π is a finite set of players,
– V is a finite set of vertices and E ⊆ V ×V is a set of edges, such that each
vertex has at least one outgoing edge1,
– (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V , where Vi is the set of vertices owned
2 by player
i ∈ Π.
A play is an infinite sequence ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω of vertices such that
(ρk, ρk+1) ∈ E for all k ∈ N. Histories are finite sequences h = h0 . . . hn ∈ V ∗
defined in the same way. We often use notation hv to mention the last vertex
v ∈ V of the history. The set of plays is denoted by Plays and the set of non
empty histories (resp. ending with a vertex in Vi) by Hist (resp. by Histi). A
prefix (resp. suffix ) of a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is a finite sequence ρ≤n = ρ0 . . . ρn
(resp. infinite sequence ρ≥n = ρnρn+1 . . .). We often use notation hρ for a play of
which history h is prefix. Given a play ρ, we denote by inf(ρ) the set of vertices
visited infinitely often by ρ. We say that ρ is a lasso if it is equal to hgω with h, g
being two histories. This lasso is called simple if hg has no repeated vertices.
Definition 2. A game G is an arena A = (Π,V, (Vi)i∈Π , E) such that each
player i has:
– a payoff function fi : Plays→ Pi where Pi is a set of payoffs,
– a preference relation ≺i ⊆ Pi × Pi on his set of payoffs.
A preference relation ≺i is a strict total order3. It allows player i to compare
two plays ρ, ρ′ ∈ Plays with respect to their payoffs: fi(ρ) ≺i fi(ρ′) means that
player i prefers ρ′ to ρ. Given p, p′ ∈ Pi, we write p i p′ when p ≺i p′ or p = p′;
notice that p ⊀i p
′ iff p′ i p since ≺i is total.
A payoff function fi is prefix-independent if fi(hρ) = fi(ρ) for all hρ ∈ Plays.
It is prefix-linear if for all hρ, hρ′ ∈ Plays,
fi(ρ) i fi(ρ
′)⇒ fi(hρ) i fi(hρ
′), and (1)
fi(ρ) ≺i fi(ρ
′)⇒ fi(hρ) ≺i fi(hρ
′). (2)
1 This condition guarantees that there is no deadlock. It can be assumed w.l.o.g. for
all the problems considered in this article.
2 We also say that player i controls the vertices of Vi.
3 that is, an irreflexive, transitive and total binary relation.
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Any prefix-independent function fi is prefix-linear.
When an initial vertex v0 ∈ V is fixed, we call (G, v0) an initialized game. In
this case, plays and histories are supposed to start in v0, and we then use nota-
tions Plays(v0), Hist(v0), and Histi(v0) (instead of Plays, Hist, and Histi).
Example 3. Consider the initialized two-player game (G, v0) in Figure 1 such that
player 1 (resp. player 2) controls vertices v0, v2, v3 (resp. vertex v1).
4 Both players
use the same set P of payoffs equal to {p1, p2, p3}, and the same payoff function
f that is prefix-independent: f((v0v1)
ω) = p1, f(v
ω
2 ) = p2, and f(v
ω
3 ) = p3.
The preference relation for player 1 (resp. player 2) is p1 ≺1 p2 ≺1 p3 (resp.
p2 ≺2 p3 ≺2 p1).
v0 v1v2 v3
Fig. 1. A two-player game with payoff functions f = f1 = f2, preference relations
p1 ≺1 p2 ≺1 p3 and p2 ≺2 p3 ≺2 p1, such that f((v0v1)
ω) = p1, f(v
ω
2 ) = p2, and
f(vω3 ) = p3
Strategies Let (G, v0) be an initialized game. A strategy σi for player i in
(G, v0) is a function σi : Histi(v0)→ V assigning to each history hv ∈ Histi(v0)
a vertex v′ = σi(hv) such that (v, v
′) ∈ E. Thus σi(hv) is the next vertex
chosen by player i (that controls vertex v) after history hv has been played. A
play ρ ∈ Plays(v0) is consistent with σi if ρn+1 = σi(ρ≤n) for all n such that
ρn ∈ Vi.
A strategy σi for player i is positional if it only depends on the last vertex
of the history, i.e., σi(hv) = σi(v) for all hv ∈ Histi(v0). More generally, it
is finite-memory if σi(hv) needs only a finite information out of the history
hv. This is possible with a finite-state machine that keeps track of histories of
plays. The strategy chooses the next vertex depending on the current state of
the machine and the current vertex in the game.5 The previous definition of
positional strategy σi for player i is given for an initialized game (G, v0). We call
it uniform if it is defined for all hv ∈ Histi (instead of Histi(v0)), that is, when
σi is a positional strategy in all initialized games (G, v), v ∈ V .
A strategy profile is a tuple (σi)i∈Π of strategies, where each σi is a strategy
of player i. It is called positional (resp. uniform, finite-memory) if all σi, i ∈ Π ,
are positional (resp. uniform, finite-memory). Given an initial vertex v0, such a
4 In all examples of this article, circle (resp. square) vertices are controlled by player 1
(resp. player 2).
5 This informal definition is enough for this survey. See for instance [38] for a definition.
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strategy profile determines a unique play of (G, v0) that is consistent with all
strategies σi. This play is called the outcome of (σi)i∈Π in (G, v0) and is denoted
by 〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0 .
Example 3 (continued). An example of strategy profile (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) is the
following one:
– the positional strategy σ2 for player 2 is defined such that σ2(hv1) = v3 for
all hv1 ∈ Hist(v0),
– the finite-memory strategy σ1 for player 1 is defined such that σ1(v0) = v1
and σ1(hv0) = v2 for all hv0 ∈ Hist(v0) \ {v0}.6 Hence player 1 chooses to
move to v1 (resp. to v2) at the first visit (resp. next visits) to v0. The needed
memory is whether the current history has visited v0 once or more time.
The outcome 〈(σ1, σ2)〉v0 is equal to v0v1v
ω
3 with payoff p3.
2.2 Studied problems
In this paper, we want to study two problems. In the first problem, one designated
player, say player 1, wants to apply a strategy that guarantees certain constraints
on the payoffs of the plays (with respect to his preference relation) against any
strategy of the other players. The other players can thus be considered as one
player, say player 2, being the opponent of player 1. This is the class of so-called
two-player zero-sum games.
Problem 4. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum game and µ, ν ∈ P1
be two bounds. Decide whether player 1 has a strategy σ1 such that µ 1 f1(ρ)
(resp. µ 1 f1(ρ) 1 ν) for all plays ρ ∈ Plays(v0) consistent with σ1.7
Case µ 1 f1(ρ) is called the threshold problem whereas case µ 1 f1(ρ) 1 ν
is called the constraint problem. When a strategy σ1 as required in Problem 4
exists, it is called winning and a play ρ consistent with σ1 is also called winning;
we also say that player 1 can ensure a payoff f1(ρ) such that µ 1 f1(ρ) (resp.
µ 1 f1(ρ) 1 ν). When this problem is decidable, we are interested in finding
its complexity class and the simplest winning strategies σ1, like positional or
finite-memory ones when they exist.
In a two-player zero-sum game G, the opposition between player 1 and
player 2 is most often described in terms of objectives. An objective Ω for
player 1 is a subset of Plays, here the set of plays ρ such that µ 1 f1(ρ)
(resp. µ 1 f1(ρ) 1 ν). Player 1 wants to ensure a play in Ω against any
strategy of player 2. As an opponent, player 2 wants wants to avoid plays in Ω,
that is, to ensure the opposite objective Plays \ Ω. We say that the game G
with objective Ω is determined if for each initial vertex v0, either player 1 has
6 As player 1 can only loop on vertices v2 and v3, we do not formally define σ1 on
histories ending with v2 or v3.
7 This problem is focused on Player 1, the payoff function f2 and preference relation
≺2 of Player 2 do not matter.
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a winning strategy to ensure Ω in (G, v0) or player 2 has a winning strategy to
ensure Plays \ Ω. Martin’s theorem [51] states that every two-player zero-sum
game with Borel objectives is determined. Nevertheless, it gives no information
on which player has a winning strategy and on the shape of such a winning
strategy. This motivates studying Problem 4.
Example 5. Let us come back to the game of Figure 1 seen as a two-player
zero-sum game (we thus focus on player 1). In (G, v0), player 1 has a winning
strategy σ1 for the threshold problem with µ = p2, that is, for the objective
Ω = {ρ | f(ρ) ∈ {p2, p3}}: take the positional strategy σ1 such that σ1(v0) = v2.
However he has no winning strategy for the threshold problem with µ = p3.
Indeed with the positional strategy σ2 such that σ2(v1) = v0, player 2 has a
winning strategy for the opposite objective since he can ensure a payoff equal to
p1 or p2.
In the second problem studied in this article, we come back to multi-player
games where each player has his own payoff function and preference relation.
Here, the players are not necessarily antagonistic: this is the class of so-called
multi-player non zero-sum games. Instead of looking for a strategy ensuring a
certain objective for one designated player, we are now interested in strategy
profiles, called solution profiles, that provide payoffs satisfactory to all players
with respect to their own objectives. A classical example of solution profile is
the notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) [53]. Informally, a strategy profile is an NE
if no player has an incentive to deviate (with respect to his preference relation)
when the other players stick to their own strategies. In other words, an NE can
be seen as a contract that makes every player satisfied in the sense that nobody
wants to break the contract if the others follow it.
Definition 6. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is a
Nash equilibrium if fi(〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0) ⊀i fi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0) for all players i ∈ Π and
all strategies σ′i of player i.
In this definition, notation (σ′i, σ−i) means the strategy profile such that
all players stick to their own strategy except player i who shifts from strat-
egy σi to strategy σ
′
i. We say that σ
′
i is a deviating strategy from σi. When
fi(〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0) ≺i fi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0), σ
′
i is called a profitable deviation for player i
with respect to (σi)i∈Π .
Example 3 (continued). Let us reconsider the non zero-sum game G of Fig-
ure 1 and the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) given previously in (G, v0) (σ1(v0) = v1,
σ1(hv0) = v2 for all hv0 ∈ Hist(v0) \ {v0}, and σ2(hv1) = v3 for all hv1 ∈
Hist(v0)). This strategy profile is an NE with outcome 〈(σ1, σ2)〉v0 = v0v1v
ω
3 .
Indeed, player 1 has no incentive to deviate since the payoff p3 of 〈σ1, σ2〉v0 is the
best possible with respect to ≺1. If player 2 uses the deviating strategy σ′2 from
σ2 such that σ
′
2(v0v1) = v0, then the resulting outcome 〈σ1, σ
′
2〉v0 = v0v1v0v
ω
2
has a less preferable payoff for him since p2 ≺2 p3. So player 2 has no profitable
deviation.
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Other kinds of solution profiles will be studied in Section 4.
Problem 7. Let (G, v0) be an initialized multi-player non zero-sum game and
(µi)i∈Π , (νi)i∈Π ∈ (Pi)i∈Π be two tuples of bounds. Decide whether there ex-
ists a solution profile (σi)i∈Π such that µi i fi(〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0) (resp. µi i
fi(〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0) i νi) for all players i ∈ Π .
Similarly to Problem 4, the two cases are respectively called threshold problem
and constraint problem, and we want to compute the complexity class and the
simplest solution profiles in case of decidability.
In Sections 3 and 4, we present some known results about solutions to Prob-
lems 4 and 7 respectively with an emphasis on general approaches. Before, we
end Section 2 with a list of payoff functions that are classically studied.
2.3 Classical payoff functions
In the classes of games that are classically studied, each player i ∈ Π uses a
real-valued payoff function fi : Plays→ R and a preference relation ≺i equal to
the usual ordering < on Pi = R. Hence, player i prefers to maximize the payoff
fi(ρ) of a play ρ.
8 In this classical setting, we focus on two particular subclasses:
the Boolean payoff functions and the quantitative payoff functions.
Boolean payoff functions A particular subclass of gamesG are those equipped
with Boolean functions fi : Plays→ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ Π , where payoff 1 (resp.
payoff 0) means that the play is the most (resp. the less) preferred by player i.
Particularly interesting related objectives are Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | fi(ρ) = 1},
i ∈ Π . Classical such objectives Ωi are ω-regular objectives like the following
ones [38,39,55].
Definition 8. – Let U ⊆ V ,
• Reachability : Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | ρ visits a vertex of U at least once},
• Safety: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | ρ visits no vertex of U},
• Bu¨chi: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | inf(ρ) ∩ U 6= ∅},
• Co-Bu¨chi: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | inf(ρ) ∩ U = ∅}.
– Let c : V → N be a coloring of the vertices by integers,
• Parity: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | the maximum color seen infinitely often along
c(ρ0)c(ρ1) . . . is even}.
– Let (Fk, Gk)1≤k≤l be a family of pairs of sets Fk, Gk ⊆ V ,
• Rabin: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | ∃k, 1 ≤ k ≤ l, such that inf(ρ) ∩ Fk = ∅ and
inf(ρ) ∩Gk 6= ∅},
• Streett: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | ∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ l, inf(ρ) ∩ Fk 6= ∅ or inf(ρ) ∩
Gk = ∅}.
– Let F ⊆ 2V be a family of subsets of vertices,
8 Alternatively, ≺i can be the ordering > meaning that player i prefers to minimize
the payoff of a play.
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• Muller9: Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | inf(ρ) ∈ F}.
Notice that reachability and safety (resp. Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi, Rabin and
Streett) are dual objectives. The complement of a parity (resp. Muller) objective
is again a parity (resp. Muller) objective: from the coloring function c : V → N,
define the new function c′ such that c′(v) = c(v)+1 for all v ∈ V (resp. from the
family F ⊆ 2V , define the new family F ′ = 2V \ F). A Bu¨chi (resp. co-Bu¨chi)
objective is a particular case of a parity objective: assign color 2 to vertices of
U and 1 to vertices of V \ U (resp. color 1 to U and 0 to V \ U). Similarly, one
can easily prove that a parity objective is both a Rabin and a Streett objective
which are themselves a Muller objective [38].
In the previous definition, the payoff function fi is prefix-independent in each
case except for reachability and safety where only condition (1) of prefix-linearity
is satisfied.
Example 9. Suppose that in the game of Figure 1, player 1 wants to achieve the
Bu¨chi objective with U = {v2, v3} whereas player 2 wants to achieve the Muller
objective with F = {{v0, v1}, {v3}}. Then the play ρ = (v0v1)ω has payoff (0, 1),
that is a payoff 0 for player 1 and a payoff 1 for player 2.
Quantitative payoff functions Classical quantitative payoff functions fi :
Plays→ R are defined from a weight function wi : E → Q as follows [19] (each
edge of the game G is thus labeled by a |Π |-tuple of weights).
Definition 10. Let wi : E → Q be a weight function and λ ∈ ]0, 1[ be a rational
discount factor. Then fi : Plays → R is defined as one among the following
payoff functions: let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays,
– Supremum: Supi(ρ) = supn∈Nwi(ρn, ρn+1),
– Infimum: Infi(ρ) = infn∈N wi(ρn, ρn+1),
– Limsup: LimSupi(ρ) = lim sup
n→∞
wi(ρn, ρn+1),
– Liminf: LimInfi(ρ) = lim inf
n→∞
wi(ρn, ρn+1),
– Mean-payoff MPi: MPi(ρ) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
wi(ρk, ρk+1),
– Mean-payoff MPi: MPi(ρ) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
wi(ρk, ρk+1),
– Discounted sum: Discλi (ρ) =
∑∞
n=0 wi(ρn, ρn+1)λ
n.
Some of these payoff functions provide natural generalizations of the previ-
ous ω-regular objectives. Indeed the supremum (resp. infimum, limsup, liminf)
function is a quantitative generalization of the reachability (resp. safety, Bu¨chi,
co-Bu¨chi) objective. The mean-payoff and discounted sum functions are much
studied in classical game theory [33].
9 A colored variant of Muller objective is defined from a coloring c : V → N of the
vertices: the family F is composed of subsets of c(V ) (instead of V ) and Ωi = {ρ ∈
P lays | inf(c(ρ0)c(ρ1) . . .) ∈ F} [39]. See [42] for several variants of Muller games.
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There are two variants of mean-payoff functions because the limit may not
exist. Nevertheless in case of a lasso ρ = hgω, both payoffs MPi(ρ) and MPi(ρ)
coincide and are equal to the average weight of the cycle g (with respect to the
weight function wi).
In Definition 10, the payoff function fi is prefix-independent in limsup, lim-
inf and mean-payoff cases, prefix-linear in discounted sum case, and satisfies
condition (1) of prefix-linearity in supremum and infimum cases.
Example 11. We equip the game of Figure 1 with two weight functions w1, w2,
leading to the game of Figure 2. Suppose that f1 = LimSup1 and f2 = MP2.
The preferences of the players with respect to plays (v0v1)
ω and v0v
ω
2 are op-
posed since f1((v0v1)
ω) = 1 < f1(v0v
ω
2 ) = 2 for player 1, and f2(v0v
ω
2 ) = 1 <
f2((v0v1)
ω) = 3 for player 2.
v0 v1v2 v3
(1, 3)
(0, 0)
(1, 3)
(0, 0)
(2, 1) (3, 2)
Fig. 2. A quantitative two-player game
In the sequel, games with the Boolean payoff functions of Definition 8 are
called Boolean games. Similarly games with the quantitative payoff functions
of Definition 10 are called quantitative games. We also speak about reachability
game, supremum game, etc, when we want to refer to a game where all the
players use the same type of payoff function. The complexity results mentioned
later depend on the number of vertices, edges and players, as well as on the
number of colors (resp. pairs, elements of F) for parity (resp. Rabin/Streett,
Muller) games, and on numerical rational values (of weights, discount factor,
and bounds) given in binary for quantitative games.
3 Two-player zero-sum games
In two-player zero-sum games, players 1 and 2 have opposite objectives. This
class of games has been much studied. In particular solutions to Problem 4
are well established for Boolean games and quantitative games as introduced
in Section 2.3. Before presenting them, we begin with the simplest situation of
games played by a unique player and we show that the problems studied in this
article are connected to problems in automata theory and numeration systems.
3.1 One-player games
In one-player games, player 1 has no opponent, he is the only player to choose the
next vertex at any moment of a play. In other words, a strategy σ1 for player 1
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is nothing else than a play ρ in the game. The statement of Problem 4 thus
simplifies as follows:10
Problem 12. Let (G, v0) be an initialized one-player game. Let µ, ν ∈ P be two
bounds. Decide whether there exists a play ρ ∈ Plays(v0) such that µ  f(ρ)
(resp. µ  f(ρ)  ν)?
Boolean games For Boolean games, this problem is interesting only with
bounds µ = ν = 1. Indeed recall that the payoff function f is Boolean and
that player 1 prefers plays ρ such that f(ρ) = 1. This is the classical well-known
non emptiness problem for automata [55]. For instance, Problem 12 for one-player
reachability (resp. Bu¨chi) games with µ = ν = 1 is the non emptiness problem
for automata accepting finite words (resp. Bu¨chi automata accepting infinite
words).
Theorem 13. Let (G, v0) be an initialized one-player Boolean game. Then Prob-
lem 12 (with µ = ν = 1) is decidable in polynomial time with positional winning
strategies, except for Streett and Muller games where finite-memory strategies
are necessary and sufficient.
Let us comment this theorem. Notice that a winning strategy for player 1
that is finite-memory (resp. positional) means that the corresponding winning
play ρ, or in terms of automata the accepted word, is a (resp. simple) lasso. It
is well-known that positional strategies are sufficient for Bu¨chi objectives. This
also happens for the other objectives except for Streett and Muller objectives
(we will discuss this point in more details in Section 3.2, see Theorem 21). Ex-
ample 14 illustrates that finite-memory strategies are necessary for Streett and
Muller games. In cases where positional strategies are sufficient, an algorithm
for Problem 12 has thus to concentrate on the existence of winning simple lassos,
which can be easily done in polynomial time. The case of Streett and Muller
games can also be solved in polynomial time [31,41]. Problem 12 is NL-complete
for reachability and Bu¨chi games [45,67] as well as for safety, co-Bu¨chi, Rabin,
parity, and Muller games, and it is P-complete for Streett games [31,60].
Example 14. Consider the initialized one-player game (G, v0) of Figure 3 with
V = {v0, v1, v2}. For the Muller objective with F = {V } (or the Streett objective
with the two pairs (F1, G1), (F2, G2) such that F1 = {v1},G1 = V and F2 = {v2},
G2 = V ), a winning play ρ ∈ Plays(v0) cannot be a simple lasso as it has to
alternate between v1 and v2.
Quantitative games Let us turn to quantitative games. The existence of plays
ρ with µ ≤ f(ρ) in one-player quantitative games (threshold problem) have been
studied in [19].
10 In Section 3.1, we omit index 1 everywhere since player 1 is the unique player of the
game.
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v0 v1v2
Fig. 3. A one-player game
Theorem 15. [19] Let (G, v0) be an initialized one-player quantitative game,
and µ ∈ Q be a rational threshold. Then deciding whether there exists a play
ρ ∈ Plays(v0) such that µ ≤ f(ρ) is solvable in polynomial time with positional
strategies.
Let us comment this theorem. Dealing with functions Sup, Inf, LimSup, and
LimInf is equivalent to respectively consider reachability, safety, Bu¨chi, and co-
Bu¨chi objectives (studied in Theorem 13). For instance, satisfying µ ≤ Sup(ρ)
is equivalent to visiting an edge with a weight ≥ µ along ρ. For functions MP,
MP, and Discλ, once one knows that positional strategies are sufficient (we will
discuss this point in more details in Section 3.2), the problem again reduces to the
existence of a simple lasso ρ = hgω with maximum payoff f(ρ). In case of mean-
payoff function, recall that both payoffs MP(ρ), MP(ρ) coincide and are equal to
the average weight of the cycle g. A polynomial algorithm is proposed in [47] to
compute a cycle in a weighted graph with maximum average weight. The case of
function Discλ is polynomially solved by a linear programming approach in [2].
We now discuss the existence of a play ρ such that µ ≤ f(ρ) ≤ ν, given two
rational bounds µ, ν ∈ Q (constraint problem). The problem is more involved,
in particular it is currently unsolved for function Discλ.
Theorem 16. [43,66] Let (G, v0) be an initialized one-player quantitative (ex-
cept discounted sum) game, and µ, ν ∈ Q be two rational bounds. Then deciding
whether there exists a play ρ ∈ Plays(v0) such that µ ≤ f(ρ) ≤ ν is solvable
in polynomial time. Positional strategies are sufficient for supremum, infimum,
limsup, and liminf games, whereas finite-memory is necessary and sufficient for
mean-payoff MP and MP games.
Let us comment this theorem. If we focus on function LimSup, looking for a
play ρ such that µ ≤ LimSup(ρ) ≤ ν reduces to the non emptiness problem for
Rabin automata (studied in Theorem 13). Indeed the required play ρ is such that
at least one weight seen infinitely often along ρ is ≥ µ and none of them is > ν.
A similar approach exists for functions Sup, Inf and LimInf. Whereas positional
winning strategies are sufficient in all these cases, finite-memory is needed for
mean-payoff functions as indicated in Example 17. Since finite-memory strategies
are sufficient [43], the problem in both cases MP, MP reduces to the existence of
a lasso ρ satisfying the constraints. This can be checked in polynomial time by
solving a linear program [66].
Example 17. Consider the game of Figure 3 equipped with the weight function
w that labels the two left edges by 0 and the two right edges by 2. A winning
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play ρ for µ = ν = 1 cannot be a simple lasso (with payoff either 0 or 2). However
the non simple lasso ρ = (v0v1v0v2)
ω is winning.
Concerning function Discλ, Problem 12 is open. It is closely related to the
following open problem, called target discounted-sum problem in [6].
Problem 18. Given three rational numbers a, b and t, and a rational discount
factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[, does there exist an infinite sequence u = u0u1 . . . ∈ {a, b}ω such
that
∑∞
n=0 unλ
n is equal to t?
The authors of [6] show that Problem 18 is related to several open questions
in mathematics and computer science. In particular it is related to numeration
systems and more precisely to β-representations of real numbers [4,50]. Given
β > 1 a real number (the base) andA ⊆ N a finite alphabet (the set of digits), a β-
representation of a real number x ≥ 0 is an infinite sequence (xn)n≤k ∈ Aω, also
written xk . . . x0.x−1x−2 . . ., such that x =
∑
n≤k xnβ
n. A well-known result [58]
is that every x ≥ 0 has a β-representation using A = {0, 1, . . . , ⌈β − 1⌉}. It
follows that Problem 18 asks whether t has a β-representation x0.x−1x−2 . . .
(with k = 0) using β = 1
λ
and A = {a, b}. This problem is therefore decidable
when a = 0, b = 1 and λ ≥ 1
2
. Indeed using the result of [58], either t > 1
β−1 and
it has no β-representation x0.x−1x−2 . . . ∈ {0, 1}ω, or t ≤
1
β−1 and it has such a
β-representation. Other partial results to Problem 18 can be found in [6].
3.2 Two-player games
We now turn to two-player zero-sum games. In Problem 4, the objective of
player 1 is the set Ω of plays ρ such that µ 1 f1(ρ) (resp. µ 1 f1(ρ) 1 ν),
whereas player 2 has the opposite objective Plays\Ω. Examples of the threshold
problem are the following ones: in a reachability game, player 1 aims at reaching
some target set of vertices whereas player 2 tries to prevent him from reaching
it; in a limsup game, player 1 aims at maximize the payoff LimSup(ρ) of the
play ρ (in a way to be ≥ µ) whereas player 2 tries to minimize it. Recall that
by Martin’s theorem, every two-player zero-sum games with Borel objectives is
determined. This large class of games includes the objectives Ω of player 1 in
Problem 4 for the Boolean and quantitative games introduced in Section 2.3. A
lot of research has been developed to solve Problem 4 that we present in this
section. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, as the objectives Ω and Plays \Ω of players 1
and 2 only depend on f1, ≺1, and P1, we simplify the used notation by omitting
index 1.
Criterium for uniform optimal strategies We begin by studying the win-
ning strategies that player 1 can use for the threshold problem in Problem 4.
This is related to the notion of value and optimal strategy.
Definition 19. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum game. If there
exists val(v0) ∈ P such that
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– player 1 has a strategy σ1 such that val(v0)  f(ρ) for all plays ρ in Plays(v0)
consistent with σ1, and
– player 2 has a strategy σ2 such that f(ρ)  val(v0) for all plays ρ in Plays(v0)
consistent with σ2,
then val(v0) = f(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) is the value of v0 and σ1 (resp. σ2) is an optimal
strategy for player 1 (resp. player 2).
Intuitively, val(v0) is the highest threshold µ for which player 1 can ensure
(with an optimal strategy) a payoff f(ρ) such that µ  f(ρ). In this definition,
the antagonistic player 2 behaves in the opposite way. When the value val(v0)
exists and is computable, the threshold problem is easily solved: we just check
whether the given threshold µ satisfies µ  val(v0). Moreover both players can
limit themselves to use optimal strategies, that is, if player 1 has a winning
strategy (resp. no winning strategy) for the threshold problem, then player 1
(resp. player 2) can use an optimal strategy as winning strategy (resp. for the
opposite objective).
Example 5 (continued). Let us come back to the two-player zero-sum game of
Example 5. Recall that in (G, v0), player 1 has a winning strategy for the thresh-
old problem with µ = p2 but not with µ = p3, meaning that val(v0) = p2. Indeed,
one can check that val(v0) = val(v1) = val(v2) = p2 and val(v3) = p3, and that
both players have optimal strategies that are positional, and even more uniform.
The values are indicated under the vertices in Figure 4, and the two uniform
optimal strategies are given as thick edges.
v0 v1v2 v3
p2 p2p2 p3
Fig. 4. Values and uniform optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum game with
f((v0v1)
ω) = p1 ≺ f(v
ω
2 ) = p2 ≺ f(v
ω
3 ) = p3
We will see later in this section that Boolean and quantitative games often
have uniform optimal strategies (see Theorems 21 and 22). In [36], the authors
propose a unified approach to all these results: they give a general criterium on
the payoff function that guarantees uniform optimal strategies for both players.
Theorem 20. [36]11 Let G be a two-player zero-sum game with a preference
relation ≺ on P such that each subset of P has an infimum and a supremum. If
the payoff function f is fairly mixing, that is,
11 The hypotheses of this theorem are those given in the full version of [36] available
at http://www.labri.fr/perso/gimbert/
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1. ∀hρ, hρ′ ∈ Plays, if f(ρ)  f(ρ′) then f(hρ)  f(hρ′),
2. ∀hρ, hρ′ ∈ Plays, min{f(ρ), f(hω)}  f(hρ)  max{f(ρ), f(hω)},
3. ∀hk ∈ Hist, k ∈ N,
min{f(h0h2h4 . . .), f(h1h3h5 . . .), infk f(hωk )}
 f(h0h1h2h3 . . .)
 max{f(h0h2h4 . . .), f(h1h3h5 . . .), supk f(h
ω
k )},
then both players have uniform optimal strategies.
Let us comment this theorem. The first condition is condition (1) of prefix-
linearity. If f is prefix-independent, then the first and the second conditions
are trivially satisfied. The third condition is concerned with shuffles of histories.
Let us apply this theorem to quantitative games, for instance to function LimSup
(see Definition 10). This function is prefix-independent and satisfies the third con-
dition since infk LimSup(h
ω
k ) ≤ LimSup(h0h1h2h3 . . .) ≤ supk LimSup(h
ω
k ). One
can check that the payoff functions of all quantitative games are fairly mixing, as
well as the payoff functions of the Boolean games with reachability, safety, Bu¨chi,
co-Bu¨chi, and parity objectives [36] (but not with Streett and Muller objectives).
The proof12 of Theorem 20 is simple and elegant; it is by induction on |E|−|V |.
If |E| = |V | then there is exactly one outgoing edge for each vertex and thus both
players have a unique possible strategy that is therefore uniform and optimal.
Suppose that |E| > |V | and let us focus on player 1 (a symmetric argument
is used for player 2). If all vertices v ∈ V1 have only one outgoing edge, then
player 1 has a unique strategy, and it is uniform and optimal. Suppose that some
v ∈ V1 has at least two outgoing edges. We partition this set of edges into two
non empty subsets E′v and E
′′
v . From G we define two smaller games G
′ and
G′′ with the same vertices and edges except that the set of outgoing edges from
v is restricted to E′v in G
′ and to E′′v in G
′′. By induction hypothesis, v has a
value val′(v) in G′ and val′′(v) in G′′, and both players have uniform optimal
strategies, respectively σ′1, σ
′
2 in G
′ and σ′′1 , σ
′′
2 in G
′′. W.l.o.g. val′′(v)  val′(v),
we then choose σ′1 as optimal strategy for player 1 in G and for all u ∈ V , we take
their value val′(u) in G′ as their value in G. Clearly σ′1 is optimal and uniform
in G. The rest of the proof consists in defining a strategy for player 2 (from σ′2
and σ′′2 ) that is optimal in G. This is possible thanks to the three conditions of
Theorem 20 applied on plays decomposed according to occurrences of v.
Further results can be found in [37]: a characterization of payoff functions is
given guaranteeing the existence of uniform optimal strategies for both players.
From this characterization, it follows that if both players have uniform optimal
strategies when playing solitary in one-player games, then they also have uniform
optimal strategies in zero-sum two-player games.
Boolean games Let us now focus on Boolean games. As for one-player games,
we limit the study of Problem 4 (threshold and constraint problems) to the only
12 Theorem 20 is given in [36] for real-valued payoff functions f : P lays → R and the
usual ordering <, but its proof is easily generalized to the statement given here.
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interesting case µ = ν = 1. The following theorem for two-player games is the
counterpart of Theorem 13 for one-player games.
Theorem 21. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum Boolean game.
Then Problem 4 (with µ = ν = 1) is
– P-complete with uniform winning strategies for reachability, safety, Bu¨chi,
and co-Bu¨chi objectives [3,30,38,44],
– P-complete with finite-memory winning strategies for Muller13 objective [41],
– NP-complete with uniform winning strategies for Rabin objective [29,30],
– co-NP-complete with finite-memory winning strategies for Streett objective [16,30],
– in NP ∩ co-NP with uniform winning strategies for parity objectives [30].
Let us comment this theorem. The existence of uniform winning strategies
(for all objectives except Rabin and Muller objectives) was previously mentioned
as a consequence of Theorem 20 [36]. Notice that here a value val(v0) = 1 is
equivalent to say that player 1 has a winning strategy for Problem 4. In case
player 1 has no winning strategy (val(v0) = 0), it follows that player 2 has a
winning strategy for the opposite objective by Martin’s theorem. Hence Theo-
rem 21 also gives information for player 2 by considering the opposite objective.
In [48], the author gives general conditions on Boolean objectives that guarantee
the existence of a uniform winning strategy for one of the players (and not nec-
essarily for both players). This includes the case of Rabin games where player 1
has a uniform winning strategy (whereas player 2 needs to use a finite-memory
strategy to win the opposite Streett objective).
Problem 4 is decidable in O(|V | + |E|) time for reachability and safety
games [38], and the current best algorithm for Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi games is
in O(|V |2) time [22]. For Muller games with F ⊆ 2V , the complexity is in
O(|F| · (|F|+ |V | · |E|)2) time [41], whereas for Rabin and Streett games with l
pairs (Fk, Gk), it is in O(|V |l+1l!) time [56]. Concerning parity games, the com-
plexity class of Problem 4 is refined to UP ∩ co-UP in [46] and a major open
problem is whether it can be solved in polynomial time. Very recently, a break-
through quasi-polynomial time algorithm has been proposed in [17] for parity
games.
Quantitative games Let us turn to quantitative games for which we first give
results for the threshold problem, and then for the constraint problem. The fol-
lowing theorem provides the known results to the threshold problem. It describes
the simplest form of winning strategies for player 1 (resp. player 2) when he has
a winning strategy for this problem (resp. for ensuring the opposite objective
when player 1 has no winning strategy).
Theorem 22. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum quantitative game,
and µ ∈ Q be a rational bound. Then the threshold problem (in Problem 4) is
13 It is PSPACE-complete for the colored variant of Muller objective [42,52].
Computer aided synthesis: a game-theoretic approach 17
– P-complete for supremum, infimum, limsup, and liminf games with uniform
winning strategies for both players,
– in NP ∩ co-NP for mean-payoff and discounted sum games with uniform
winning strategies for both players [71].
Let us comment this theorem. We already know the existence of uniform
winning strategies from Theorem 20 [36]. The P-completeness for supremum, in-
fimum, limsup, and liminf games follows from the P-completeness for reachability,
safety, Bu¨chi, and co-Bu¨chi games in Theorem 21. Parity games are polynomially
reducible to mean-payoff games [46] which are themselves polynomially reducible
to discounted sum games [71]. For these three classes of games, from the exis-
tence of uniform winning strategies, we get a threshold problem in NP as follows:
guess a uniform strategy σ1 for player 1 (by choosing one outgoing edge (v, v
′) for
all v ∈ V1), fix this strategy σ1 in the game G to get a one-player game Gσ1 , ap-
ply the related polynomial time algorithm of Theorems 13 or 15 (from the point
of view of player 2 who controls Gσ1). The co-NP membership is symmetrically
obtained with player 2.
Concerning the constraint problem, recall that it is more complex already for
one-player games (see Section 3.1) with no known solution for discounted sum
games (see Problem 18).
Theorem 23. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum quantitative (ex-
cept discounted sum) game, and µ, ν ∈ Q be rational bounds. Then the constraint
problem (in Problem 4) is
– P-complete for supremum, infimum, limsup, and liminf games with uniform
winning strategies for both players [13,43],
– in NP ∩ co-NP for mean-payoff games with finite-memory (resp. uniform)
winning strategies for player 1 (resp. player 2) [43].
Discounted sum games are studied with bounds µ, ν such that µ < ν (to avoid
the case µ = ν of Problem 18) in [43] where it is proved that the constraint
problem is PSPACE-complete with finite-memory winning strategies for both
players.
3.3 Variants of preferences
Several extensions14 of two-player zero-sum Boolean and quantitative games
have been studied in the literature, by using preferences that are irreflexive and
transitive but not necessarily total, or more generally by using preorders  that
are reflexive and transitive binary relations (hence,  is not supposed to be total
and one can have p  p′ and p′  p such that p 6= p′).
Such variants naturally appear when we study intersection of objectives in-
stead of a single objective as in Section 2.3:
14 The reader who prefers to know classical solutions to Problem 7 for multi-player non
zero-sum games can skip this section and go directly to Section 4.
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– Intersection of homogeneous objectives. For instance player 1 has l reachabil-
ity objectives U1, . . . , Ul (instead of just one), and he wants to visit all the
sets U1, . . . , Ul.
– Intersection of heterogeneous objectives. In this more general case, player 1
has several objectives not necessarily of the same type. Let us imagine a
situation where he has two quantitative objectives depending on two weight
functions on the graph, like ensuring a threshold for the liminf of weights
with respect to the first weight function and another threshold for the mean-
payoff with respect to the second weight function.
In this context, for player 1, we consider a tuple f¯ of payoff functions and a
tuple w¯ of weight functions (instead of a single payoff function f defined from a
single weight function w) such that each function fk : Plays→ R is defined from
wk : E → Q.15 Tuples of payoffs p¯ = f¯(ρ) and p¯′ = f¯(ρ′) are then compared
using the usual ordering on tuples of reals: p¯ ≺ord p¯′ iff pk ≤ p′k for all components
k and there exists k such that pk < p
′
k (the preference relation ≺ord is not total).
Let us mention some results first for quantitative objectives and then for Boolean
objectives.
Combination of quantitative objectives The threshold problem takes the
following form: given a tuple µ¯ of rational thresholds, decide whether player 1
has a strategy σ1 that ensures a payoff f¯(ρ) such that µ¯ ≺ord f¯(ρ) for all plays
ρ consistent with σ1.
Theorem 24. [69] Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum game with
homogeneous intersections of mean-payoff objectives. Then the threshold problem
(in Problem 4) is
– in NP ∩ co-NP for functions MP,
– is co-NP-complete for functions MP.
In both cases, infinite memory is required for winning strategies of player 1
whereas uniform winning strategies are sufficient for player 2.
This theorem indicates different behaviors for the functionsMP andMP. This
is illustrated with the example of the initialized one-player game (G, v0) depicted
in Figure 5, where player 1 wants to ensure the intersection of two homogeneous
objectives. It is shown in [69] that for a pair of functions MP, player 1 can ensure
a threshold (1, 1), and that for a pair of functions MP, he can ensure a threshold
(2, 2) (which is impossible with MP). In both cases infinite memory is necessary.
Indeed recall that with a finite-memory strategy the produced play is a lasso
ρ = hgω such that MP(ρ) = MP(ρ) is the average weight of the cycle g. Here
this average weight has the form a · (2, 0) + b · (0, 0) + c · (0, 2) = (2a, 2c), with
a+b+c = 1 and b > 0. Clearly (1, 1) 6≺ord (2a, 2c) showing that player 1 is losing
for threshold (1, 1) with finite-memory strategies.
15 This tuple of payoff functions is used by player 1 contrarily to Definition 2 where
function fi is used by player i for all i ∈ Π .
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v0 v1
(0, 0)
(2, 0)
(0, 0)
(0, 2)
Fig. 5. A one-player game with a pair of weight functions w¯
In [68], the author studies objectives equal to Boolean combinations of in-
equalities fk(ρ) ∼ µk, with ∼ ∈ {≤,≥} and fk ∈ {MP,MP}: deciding whether
player 1 has a winning strategy in (G, v0) becomes undecidable. However, this
problem remains decidable and is EXPTIME-complete for CNF/DNF Boolean
combinations of functions taken among {Sup, Inf, LimSup, LimInf,WMP} [13], where
WMP is an interesting window variant of mean-payoff introduced in [20]. The
threshold problem is P-complete (resp. EXPTIME-complete) for a single WMP
objective (resp. an intersection of WMP objectives) [20]. Recall that it is in NP
∩ co-NP for a single function MP or MP (see Theorem 22).
Combination of Boolean objectives Concerning one-player games, Boolean
combinations of Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives are introduced in [31] as a gen-
eralization of Rabin and Streett objectives. It is proved that the non emptiness
problem for this class of automata is NP-complete (for a comparison see Theo-
rem 13). Concerning two-player games, the intersection of homogeneous objec-
tives is simple for safety, co-Bu¨chi, Streett, and Muller cases. Indeed the intersec-
tion of safety (resp. co-Bu¨chi, Streett, Muller) objectives is again a safety (resp.
co-Bu¨chi, Streett, Muller) objective. In the other cases, we have the following
results to be compared with those of Theorem 21.
Theorem 25. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum game with an
intersection of homogeneous objectives. Then Problem 4 is
– PSPACE-complete for reachability objectives with finite-memory winning strate-
gies for both players [32],
– P-complete for Bu¨chi objectives with finite-memory (resp. uniform) winning
strategies for player 1 (resp. player 2) [21],
– co-NP-complete for parity objectives with finite-memory (resp. uniform) win-
ning strategies for player 1 (resp. player 2) [24],
– PSPACE-complete for Rabin objectives with finite-memory winning strategies
for both players.16
16 We found no reference for this result. The PSPACE membership (resp. the finite
memory of the strategies) follows from [1] (resp. [13]). In [1], games with a union of
a Streett objective and a Rabin objective are shown to be PSPACE-hard. It is thus
also the case for games with a union of Streett objectives. By Martin’s theorem, it
follows that games with an intersection of Rabin objectives are PSPACE-hard.
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Problem 4 is PSPACE-complete for heterogeneous intersections of reachabil-
ity and Bu¨chi objectives [13] as well as for Boolean combinations of Bu¨chi objec-
tives [1,42].
Lexicographic and secure preferences For a tuple f¯ of payoff functions
defined from a tuple w¯ of weight functions for player 1, let us mention two other
natural preference relations ≺.
Definition 26. Let p¯, p¯′ be two tuples of real payoffs.
– lexicographic preference: p¯ ≺lex p¯′ iff there exists k such that pk < p′k and
pj = p
′
j for all j ≤ k. That is, player 1 prefers to first maximize the first
component, then the second, then the third, etc (see for instance [5]).
– secure preference: p¯ ≺sec p¯′ iff either p1 < p′1 or {p1 = p
′
1, pk ≥ p
′
k for
all components k > 1, and there exists k > 1 such that pk > p
′
k}. That is,
player 1 prefers to first maximize the first component, and then to minimize
all the other components (see for instance [28]).
The lexicographic preference is total whereas the secure preference is total
only for pairs (instead of tuples) of payoffs. In the latter case, we get a preference
which is close to the lexicographic ordering: player 1 prefers to maximize the first
component, and then to minimize the second one. The secure preference is used
in the notion of secure equilibrium discussed later in Section 4.3.
Theorem 27. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player zero-sum game.
– Suppose that ≺ is the lexicographic preference ≺lex. Then the threshold prob-
lem (in Problem 4) for function MP is in NP ∩ co-NP with uniform winning
strategies for both players [5].
– Suppose that ≺ is the secure preference ≺sec on pairs of payoffs. Then the
threshold problem (in Problem 4) is in NP ∩ co-NP (resp. P-complete) for
functions MP, MP, and Discλ (resp. for functions Sup, Inf, LimSup, and
LimInf). Moreover both players have uniform (resp. positional) winning strate-
gies for functions LimSup, LimInf, MP, MP, and Discλ (resp. for functions
Sup and Inf) [14].
In this theorem, it is supposed that the components fk of f¯ are all of the same
type (for instance they are all limsup functions); and some results stating the
existence of uniform winning strategies can be established thanks to Theorem 20.
Notice that the secure preference is limited to pairs of payoffs in a way to be total,
which is a necessary condition when dealing with values. Notice also that the
authors in [5] consider liminf average of the weight vector under lexicographic
ordering whereas the authors in [14] consider the secure ordering of components
where each component is the liminf average value.
The threshold problem is studied in [7] in a general context: the players can
use various preorders (like the lexicographic preference, a preorder given by a
Boolean circuit, etc), the players play concurrently and not in a turned-based
way, and the objectives are Boolean as in Definition 8.
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4 Multi-player non zero-sum games
In multi-player non zero-sum games, the different players i ∈ Π are not necessar-
ily antagonistic, they have their own payoff functions fi and preference relations
≺i. Each of them follows a strategy σi, the resulting strategy profile (σi)i∈Π
induces a play that should be satisfactory to all players. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.2 (see Definition 6), a classical solution profile is the notion of NE, where
no player has an incentive to deviate when the other players stick to their own
strategies. It is proved in [25,39] that there exists an NE in every initialized
multi-player non zero-sum game with Borel Boolean objectives. We go further
by presenting in this section additional existence results for quantitative games
and some known results for NEs as a solution to Problem 7 (threshold problem
and constraint problem). As in Section 3, we focus on general approaches.
4.1 Characterization of outcomes of NE
Given a multi-player non zero-sum game G and an initial vertex v0, we begin
by a characterization of plays ρ ∈ Plays(v0) that are the outcome of an NE
(σi)i∈Π in (G, v0). It will imply the existence of NE in large classes of games
(see Corollaries 29 and 30), and will be useful for the study of Problem 7 (see
Theorems 31 and 32). This characterization is related to a family of two-player
zero-sum games Gi, one for each i ∈ Π , associated with G and defined as follows.
(i) The game Gi has the same arena as G, (ii) the two players are player i
(player 1) and player −i (player 2) formed by the coalition of the other players
j ∈ Π \ {i}, (iii) the payoff function of player i is equal to fi and his preference
relation is equal to ≺i17. For all v ∈ V , when it exists, we denote by vali(v) the
value of vertex v in game Gi, and by τ
v
i , τ
v
−i the related optimal strategies for
players i,−i respectively in (Gi, v) (see Definition 19).
Proposition 28. Let G be a multi-player non zero-sum game such that for all
i ∈ Π,
– the payoff function fi is prefix-linear, and
– in the game Gi, all vertices has a value.
Then ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays(v0) is the outcome of an NE in (G, v0) iff vali(ρk) i
fi(ρ≥k) for all i ∈ Π and all k ∈ N such that ρk ∈ Vi.
The condition of this proposition asks that for all k, if vertex ρk is controlled
by player i, then in the two-player zero-sum game Gi, its value is less preferred
or equal to the payoff of the suffix ρ≥k. The proposed characterization appears
under various particular forms, for instance in [14,39,65]. It is here given under
two general conditions already studied in Section 3.2. Recall that almost all the
payoff functions considered in Section 2.3 are prefix-linear and that for all the
17 Recall that the payoff function and the preference relation of the second player do
not matter in two-player zero-sum games.
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related two-player zero-sum games Gi, the vertices have a value. Notice that
when fi is prefix-independent, condition vali(ρk) i fi(ρ≥k) for all k ∈ N with
ρk ∈ Vi simplifies in max{vali(ρk) | k ∈ N, ρk ∈ Vi} i fi(ρ) (the maximum
exists since Vi is finite).
Example 3 (continued). An example of NE with outcome ρ = v0v1v
ω
3 was given
in Example 3 for the initialized game (G, v0) of Figure 1. Let us verify that
ρ satisfies the characterization of Proposition 28. Recall that both players use
the same payoff function f that is prefix-independent. The values of G1 were
computed in Example 5: val1(v0) = val1(v1) = val1(v2) = p2 and val1(v3) = p3.
Similarly one can compute the values of G2: val2(v0) = val2(v2) = p2 and
val2(v1) = val2(v3) = p3. One checks that max{vali(ρk) | k ∈ N, ρk ∈ Vi} i
f(ρ) = p3, for i = 1, 2.
The proof of Proposition 28 is easy to establish.
Firstly suppose that ρ is the outcome of an NE (σi)i∈Π and that there exist
i ∈ Π and k ∈ N with ρk ∈ Vi such that fi(ρ≥k) ≺i vali(ρk). Let us show that
player i has a profitable deviation σ′i with respect to (σi)i∈Π in contradiction with
(σi)i∈Π being an NE. The strategy σ
′
i consists in playing according to σi until
producing ρ≤k and from ρk in playing according to his optimal strategy τ
ρk
i (in
(Gi, ρk)). The payoff of the resulting play pi from ρk is such that vali(ρk) i fi(pi)
by optimality of τρki , and thus fi(ρ≥k) ≺i fi(pi). From prefix-linearity of fi it
follows that fi(ρ) = fi(ρ<kρ≥k) ≺i fi(ρ<kpi) as required.
Secondly suppose that vali(ρk) i fi(ρ≥k) for all i ∈ Π and all k ∈ N such
that ρk ∈ Vi. We are going to construct an NE by using a well-known method in
classical game theory that is used in the proof of the Folk Theorem in repeated
games [54]. We define a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π that produces ρ as outcome, and
as soon as some player i deviates from ρ, say at vertex ρk, all the other players (as
a coalition) punish him by playing from ρk the optimal strategy τ
ρk
−i (in (Gi, ρk)).
Let us show that (σi)i∈Π is an NE. Let σ
′
i be a deviating strategy from σi for
player i, and let ρ′ be the outcome of the strategy profile (σ′i, σ−i). Consider the
longest common prefix ρ≤k of ρ and ρ
′. Then ρk ∈ Vi and by optimality of τ
ρk
−i ,
we get fi(ρ
′
≥k) i vali(ρk) and thus fi(ρ
′
≥k) i fi(ρ≥k). From prefix-linearity of
fi it follows that fi(ρ
′) i fi(ρ) showing that σ
′
i is not a profitable deviation for
player i.
Notice that in this proof, the first (resp. second) implication only requires
condition (2) (resp. (1)) of prefix-linearity of fi. The next corollary follows from
this observation and Proposition 28.
Corollary 29. [27] Let G be a multi-player non zero-sum game such that for
all i ∈ Π,
– the payoff function fi satisfies fi(ρ) i fi(ρ′) ⇒ fi(hρ) i fi(hρ′) for all
hρ, hρ′ ∈ Plays, and
– each game Gi has uniform optimal strategies for both players.
Then there exists a finite-memory NE in each initialized game (G, v0).
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This corollary is a generalization of a theorem18 given in [12,27] for the ex-
istence of NEs in games equipped with payoff functions fi : Plays→ R, i ∈ Π .
The proof of Corollary 29 is as follows. Let us consider the play ρ ∈ Plays(v0)
produced by the players when each player i plays according to his optimal strat-
egy τi in (Gi, v0) (τ
v
i = τi for all vertices v since it is uniform). By construction,
ρ is the outcome of an NE because it satisfies the characterization of Proposi-
tion 28. Notice that ρ is a simple lasso since each τi, i ∈ Π , is uniform. Therefore
the strategies of the constructed NE are finite-memory with a small memory size
bounded by |V | + |Π | to remember this lasso and the first player who deviates
from ρ.
The existence of an NE is also guaranteed in the following corollary that
does not require optimal strategies that are uniform, but in counterpart requires
payoff functions that are prefix-independent.
Corollary 30. [27] Let G be a multi-player non zero-sum game such that for
all i ∈ Π,
– the payoff function fi is prefix-independent, and
– each game Gi has (resp. finite-memory) optimal strategies for both players.
Then there exists an (resp. finite-memory) NE in each initialized game (G, v0).
This is a generalization of a result given in [27] for games equipped with
payoff functions fi : Plays → R, i ∈ Π . The proof is as follows: under the
hypotheses of Corollary 30, one can show that there exist optimal strategies τv0i
in (Gi, v0), i ∈ Π , such that for all plays ρ ∈ Plays(v0) consistent with τ
v0
i ,
we have max{vali(ρk) | k ∈ N, ρk ∈ Vi} i fi(ρ). Then as in Corollary 29, we
consider the play ρ ∈ Plays(v0) obtained when each player i plays according
to his optimal strategy τv0i . As each fi is prefix-independent, ρ satisfies the
characterization of Proposition 28.
From Corollaries 29 and 30, it follows that there exists an NE (which can be
constructed) in every game of Section 2.3; the case of Boolean (resp. quantitative)
game is proved in [25,39] (resp. in [12,27]). The existence of an NE in discounted
sum games can be obtained in a second way: the function Discλ is continuous and
all games with real-valued continuous payoff functions always have an NE [35,40].
Notice that the two previous corollaries allow mixing the types of functions fi,
like for instance f1 associated with a Bu¨chi objective, a limsup function f2, a
mean-payoff function f3, etc.
Conditions generalizing those of Corollaries 29 and 30 are given in [59] that
guarantee the existence of a finite-memory NE. Moreover, for most of the given
conditions counterexamples are provided that show that they cannot be dis-
pensed with.
4.2 Solution to Problem 7
In this section we study how to solve Problem 7 for NEs (threshold problem
and constraint problem). The characterization given in Proposition 28 provides
18 In [12], one hypothesis is missing: the required optimal strategies must be uniform.
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a general approach to solve this problem. Indeed consider the case of initial-
ized games (G, v0) with prefix-independent payoff functions fi and such that
the vertices of each game Gi, i ∈ Π , has a value. Then given two tuples of
bounds (µi)i∈Π , (νi)i∈Π , we simply have to check whether there exists a play
ρ ∈ Plays(v0) such that for all i ∈ Π ,
max{vali(ρk) | ρk ∈ Vi} i fi(ρ) and µi i fi(ρ) (resp. µi i fi(ρ) i νi). (3)
Thanks to this general approach or variations based on Proposition 28, Prob-
lem 7 is solved for Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi, Streett, and parity games in [64], and for
the other Boolean games in [26].
Theorem 31. [26,64] Let (G, v0) be an initialized multi-player non zero-sum
Boolean game. Then Problem 7 is
– is P-complete for Bu¨chi and Muller19 games,
– NP-complete for reachability, safety, co-Bu¨chi, parity and Streett games,
– in PNP, and NP-hard, co-NP-hard for Rabin games.
Let us explain the proof of NP membership for parity games and the con-
straint problem with bounds (µi)i∈Π , (νi)i∈Π . As each Gi is a two-player zero-
sum parity game, recall that the constraint problem is in NP ∩ co-NP with
uniform winning strategies for both players (see Theorem 21). The required algo-
rithm in NP is as follows. (i) For all i ∈ Π , in the game Gi, guess a subset Ui ⊆ V
of vertices and two uniform strategies τi, τ−i for players i,−i respectively (intu-
itively we guess Ui = {v ∈ V | vali(v) = 1} and V \ Ui = {v ∈ V | vali(v) = 0}).
Check in polynomial time20 that τi is a winning strategy for player i for the
constraint problem in each (Gi, v) with v ∈ Ui and that τ−i is a winning strat-
egy for player −i for the opposite objective in each (Gi, v) with v ∈ V \ Ui.
(ii) Then for all i ∈ Π , we guess ri ∈ Vi (intuitively we guess ri such that
vali(ri) = max{vali(ρk) | k ∈ N, ρk ∈ Vi} for the required play ρ). Construct in
polynomial time a one-player game G′ from G such that each set Vi of vertices
is limited to {v ∈ Vi | vali(v) ≤ vali(ri)} and the unique player is formed by the
coalition of all players i ∈ Π . (iii) By (3) it remains to check whether there exists
a play ρ in (G′, v0) such that for all i ∈ Π , vali(ri) ≤ fi(ρ) and µi ≤ fi(ρ) ≤ νi.
Recall that the existence of plays satisfying certain constraints in one-player
games was studied in Section 3.1, see Theorem 13. Here we are faced with the
existence of a play in game with an intersection of parity objectives which can
be checked in polynomial time by [31].
Problem 7 can be similarly solved for quantitative games.
Theorem 32. [26,64,65] Let (G, v0) be an initialized multi-player non zero-sum
quantitative (except discounted sum) game. Then Problem 7 is
19 We found no reference for Muller objectives. A sketch of proof is given in the
appendix. Problem 7 is PSPACE-complete for the colored variant of Muller objec-
tives [26].
20 Recall our comment after Theorem 22.
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– P-complete for limsup games,
– NP-complete for supremum, infimum, liminf, mean-payoff MPi, and mean-
payoff MPi games.
The case of supremum, infimum, limsup and liminf games is equivalent to
the case of reachability, safety, Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi games presented in Theo-
rem 31, whereas the case of mean-payoff games is studied in [65]. The proof of
NP membership for mean-payoff games is based on the approach (3), and is sim-
ilar to the one given above for parity games. The case of discounted sum games
is open. Indeed it is proved in [14] that Problem 18 reduces to Problem 7 with
the discounted sum function.21
Problem 7 is studied in [7] in a general context: the players can use various
preorders, they play concurrently and not in a turned-based way, and the ob-
jectives are Boolean as in Definition 8. The general approach proposed in [7] is
different from the one of Proposition 28.
4.3 Other solution profiles
In this section, we present some other solution profiles. Indeed the notion of NE
has several drawbacks: (i) Each player is selfish since he is only concerned with
his own payoff, and not with the payoff of the other players. (ii) An NE does not
take into account the sequential nature of games played on graphs. We illustrate
these drawbacks in the following two examples of quantitative game.
Example 33. Consider the two-player quantitative game of Figure 6 such that
fi = LimSupi for i = 1, 2. The strategy profile depicted with thick edges is an NE.
Notice that player 1 could decide to deviate at v0 by moving to v2. Indeed he
then keeps the same payoff of 1 but also decreases the payoff of player 2 (from 2
to 1) which is bad for player 2. To avoid such a drawback, we will introduce
hereafter the concept of secure equilibrium, where each player take cares of his
own payoff as well as the payoff of the other players (but in a negative way).
Consider now the game of Figure 7 where the weights of the loops have
been modified. The depicted strategy profile is again an NE. Player 1 has no
incentive to deviate at v0 due to the threat of player 2: player 1 will receive a
payoff of 0 < 1. Such a threat of player 2 is non credible because in the subgame
induced by v2, v3, v4, at vertex v2, it is more rational for player 2 to move to v4
to get a payoff of 2 instead of going to v3 where he only receives a payoff of 1.
To avoid such a drawback, we will introduce hereafter the concept of subgame
perfect equilibrium that takes into account rational behaviors of the players in
all subgames of the initial game.
Secure equilibria The notion of secure equilibrium (SE) is introduced in [23]
for two-player non zero-sum games. The idea of an SE is that no player has an
incentive to deviate in the following sense: he will not be able to increase his
21 The reduction is given for another kind of solution profile but it also works for NEs.
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v0
v1 v2
v3 v4
(0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 2)
(0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 1) (2, 0)
Fig. 6. An NE that is not a secure equi-
librium
v0
v1 v2
v3 v4
(0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (3, 2)
Fig. 7. An NE that is not a subgame
perfect equilibrium
payoff, and keeping the same payoff he will not be able to decrease the payoff of
the other player. An SE can thus be seen as a contract between the two players
which strengthens cooperation: if a player chooses another strategy that is not
harmful to himself, then this cannot harm the other player if the latter follows
the contract.
The definition of an SE is given in the context of games equipped with payoff
functions fi : Plays → R, i ∈ Π . It uses the notion of secure preference intro-
duced in Section 3.3 (see Definition 2622). Let us recall the secure preference
≺sec,i for player i: given p¯ = (fi(ρ))i∈Π , p¯′ = (fi(ρ′))i∈Π , we have p¯ ≺sec,i p¯′ iff
either pi < p
′
i or {pi = p
′
i, pk ≥ p
′
k for all components k 6= i, and there exists
k 6= i such that pk > p′k}. Hence player i prefers to increase his own payoff, and
in case of equality to decrease the payoffs of all the other players. This preference
relation is not total except when there are only two players.
The definition of an SE is very close to the one of NE (see Definition 6). The
only difference is that it uses the secure preference:
Definition 34. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is
a secure equilibrium if
(fi(〈(σi)i∈Π〉v0))i∈Π ⊀sec,i (fi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0))i∈Π
for all players i ∈ Π and all strategies σ′i of player i.
Example 33 (continued). The strategy profile of Figure 6 is not an SE because
player 1 has a profitable deviation if at v0 he chooses to move to v2: (1, 2) ≺sec,1
(1, 1).
By definition, every SE is an NE but the converse is false as shown in the
previous example. It is proved in [23] that every two-player non zero-sum game
with Borel Boolean objectives has an SE; this result is generalized to multi-player
games in [28].
22 The definition was given for player 1.
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Let us turn to quantitative games such that all the players have the same
type of payoff function fi. General hypotheses are provided in [28] that guarantee
the existence of an SE in quantitative games, except for functions MPi and MPi.
Thanks to Corollary 29 and Theorem 27, for two-player23 quantitative games
(now including functions MPi and MPi), there exists such an SE that is finite-
memory [14]. Moreover, with the same general approach (3) described previously
for NEs, Problem 7 is solved as follows for SEs.
Theorem 35. [14] Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player non zero-sum quan-
titative (except discounted sum) game. Then Problem 7 for SEs is
– P-complete for supremum, infimum, limsup, and liminf functions,
– in NP ∩ co-NP for functions MPi and MPi.
The case of discounted sum function is open since it is proved in [14] that
Problem 18 reduces to Problem 7 with Discλ. The complexity class of the problem
of deciding whether, in an initialized two-player parity game (G, v0), there exists
an SE with payoff respectively equal to (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1), is studied
in [23,39].
Subgame perfect equilibria A solution profile that avoids incredible threats
by taking into account the sequential nature of games played on graphs is the
notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) [61]. For being an SPE, a strategy
profile is not only required to be an NE from the initial vertex but after every
possible history of the game.
Before giving the definition of an SPE, we need to introduce the following
concepts for an initialized game (G, v0) with payoff functions fi and preference
relations ≺i, for all i ∈ Π . Given a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), the subgame (G|h, v)
of (G, v0) is the initialized game with payoff functions fi|h, i ∈ Π , such that
fi|h(ρ) = fi(hρ) for all plays ρ ∈ Plays(v) (the preference relation of player i is
his preference ≺i in G). Given a strategy σi for player i in (G, v0), the strategy
σi|h in (G|h, v) is defined as σi|h(h
′) = σi(hh
′) for all h′ ∈ Histi(v).
Definition 36. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile (σi)i∈Π is
a subgame perfect equilibrium if (σi|h)i∈Π is an NE in each subgame (G|h, v) of
(G, v0) with hv ∈ Hist(v0).
Example 33 (continued). The strategy profile (σ1, σ2) of Figure 7 is not an SPE
because in the subgame (G|v0 , v2), player 2 has a profitable deviation with respect
to (σ1|v0 , σ2|v0) if at v2 he chooses to move to v4.
By definition, every SPE is an NE but the converse is false as shown in
the previous example. A well-known result is the existence of an SPE in every
initialized game (G, v0) such that its arena is a tree rooted at v0
24 [49]. The SPE
23 A restriction to two-player games is necessary to deal with a secure preference that
is total.
24 In this particular context, plays are finite paths.
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is constructed backwards from the leaves to the initial vertex v0 in the following
way. Suppose that the current vertex v is controlled by player i, and that for
each son v′ of v one has already constructed an SPE (σv
′
i )i∈Π in the subtree
rooted at v′. Then player i chooses the edge (v, v′) such that (σv
′
i )i∈Π has the
best outcome with respect to his preference relation ≺i. The resulting strategy
profile (σvi )i∈Π is an SPE in the subtree rooted at v.
It is proved in [63] that there exists an SPE in every multi-player non zero-
sum game with Borel Boolean objectives, and that in case of ω-regular objectives
there exists one that is finite-memory. Existence of an SPE also holds for games
with continuous real-valued payoff functions [35,40] (this is also holds when the
functions are upper-semicontinuous (resp. lower-semicontinuous) and with finite
range [34] (resp. [57])).
For subgame perfect equilibria, we are not aware of a characterization like
the one in Proposition 28. Therefore a solution to Problem 7 for SPEs needs a
different approach. Few solutions are known: this problem is in EXPTIME for
Rabin games [63] and is NP-hard for co-Bu¨chi games [39].
Whereas NEs exist for large classes of games, see Corollaries 29 and 30, SPEs
fail to exist even in simple games like the one of Figure 1 [62]. Variants of SPE,
weak SPE and very weak SPE, have thus been proposed in [11] as interesting
alternatives. In a weak SPE (resp. very weak SPE), a player who deviates from
a strategy σ is allowed to use deviating strategies that differ from σ on a finite
number of histories only (resp. only on the initial vertex ). Deviating strategies
that only differ on the initial vertex are a well-known notion that for instance
appears in the proof of Kuhn’s theorem [49] with the one-step deviation property.
By definition, every SPE is a weak SPE, and every weak SPE is a very weak
SPE. Weak SPE and very weak SPE are equivalent notions, but this is not true
for SPE and weak SPE [11].
The following theorem gives two general conditions such that each of them
separately guarantees the existence of a weak SPE.
Theorem 37. [15] Let G be a multi-player non zero-sum game such that
– either each payoff function fi, i ∈ Π, is prefix-independent,
– or each fi, i ∈ Π, has a finite range.
Then there exists a weak SPE in each initialized game (G, v0).
This theorem has to be compared with Corollary 30 that gives general con-
ditions for the existence of an NE, one of them being prefix-independence of fi,
i ∈ Π . This latter condition is here enough to guarantee the existence of a weak
SPE (the existence of an SPE is not possible as mentioned before with the game
of Figure 1 [62]). It follows from Theorem 37 that there exists a weak SPE in
all the Boolean and quantitative games of Section 2.3 (except for the case of
discounted sum payoff that is neither prefix-independent nor with finite range).
In addition to SEs and (weak) SPEs, other solution profiles have been recently
proposed, like Doomsday equilibria in [18], robust equilibria in [8], and equilibria
using admissible strategies in [10]. We also refer the reader to the survey [9].
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5 Conclusion
In this invited contribution, we gave an overview of classical as well as recent
results about the threshold and constraint problems for games played on graphs.
Solutions to these problems are winning strategies in case of two-player zero-
sum games, and equilibria in case of multi-player non zero-sum games. We tried
to present a unified approach through the notion of games equipped with a
payoff function and a preference relation for each player, in a way to include
classes of Boolean games and quantitative games that are usually studied. We
also focussed on general approaches from which one can derived several different
results: a criterium that guarantees the existence of uniform optimal strategies in
two-player zero-sum games, and a characterization of plays that are the outcome
of an Nash equilibrium in multi-player non zero-sum games. Several illustrative
examples were provided as well as some intuition on the proofs when they are
simple.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we give a sketch of proof for Muller games in Theorem 31.
Recall that each player i has the objective Ωi = {ρ ∈ Plays | inf(ρ) ∈ Fi} with
Fi ⊆ 2V , and that the values vali(v), v ∈ V , in each game Gi can be computed
in polynomial time (Theorem 21). To prove P membership for the constraint
problem with bounds (µi)i∈Π , (νi)i∈Π , we apply the approach (3). Notice that
for the required play ρ ∈ Plays(v0) in (3), the set U = inf(ρ) must be a strongly
connected component that is reachable from the initial vertex v0. Moreover if for
some i, fi(ρ) = 0 then vali(ρk) = 0 for all ρk ∈ Vi, and if νi = 0, then fi(ρ) = 0.
We thus proceed as follows. (i) For each i such that νi = 1, for each U ∈ Fi (seen
as a potential U = inf(ρ)), the following computations are done in polynomial
time for all j ∈ Π :
– if µj = 1 ((3) imposes fj(ρ) = 1), test whether U ∈ Fj ,
– if νj = 0 ((3) imposes fj(ρ) = 0), test whether U 6∈ Fj and whether each
v ∈ U ∩ Vj has value valj(v) = 0,
– if µj = 0 and νj = 1 ((3) allows either fj(ρ) = 0 or fj(ρ) = 1), then if
U 6∈ Fj , test whether each v ∈ U ∩ Vj has value valj(v) = 0.
Finally, construct in polynomial time the game G′ from G such that each Vj is
limited to {v ∈ Vj | valj(v) = 0} whenever U 6∈ Fj, and test whether U is a
strongly connected component that is reachable from v0 in G
′. As soon as this
sequence of tests is positive, there exists ρ satisfying (3). (ii) It may happen that
step (i) cannot be applied (because there is no j such that µj = 1, and for j
such that µj = 0 and νj = 1, there is no potential U = inf(ρ)). In this case, we
construct in polynomial time a two-player game G′ from G such that each Vi
is limited to {v ∈ Vi | vali(v) = 0}, player 1 controls no vertex and player 2 is
formed by the coalition of all i ∈ Π , and the objective is a Muller objective with
F = ∪i∈ΠFi. We then test in polynomial time whether player 1 has no winning
strategy from v0 in this Muller game.
